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I. INTRODUCTION
The implementation of post-grant trial proceedings in the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO or Office) is one of the most significant aspects of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.1 Practitioners have a great deal of new
subject matter to master. In addition to the relevant statutes governing
derivation proceedings,2 inter partes review,3 post-grant review,4 and transitional
post-grant review proceedings for covered business method patents,5 there are
several new corresponding USPTO final rule packages6 and a USPTO trial
guide7 to study.
All of this new law is superimposed, however, on an existing legal landscape
relating to the practitioner’s and patent owner’s duties of candor and the
potential consequences for candor violations. And the new law creates
additional candor and disclosure obligations specifically applicable in post-grant
contested proceedings.
This Article discusses the “old” and “new” candor obligations of
practitioners and their clients—their source, their reach and applicability, and
the potential consequences for their breach—in the context of the
representation of clients in the new USPTO post-grant contested proceedings.
Following a discussion of the relevant USPTO rules and other applicable law,
this paper identifies several examples of statements and conduct in post-grant
proceedings that may particularly implicate the practitioner’s duties of candor
and/or disclosure and, accordingly, warrant heightened care on the part of
practitioners (registered and unregistered)8 and parties who participate in the
new proceedings.

Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299 (2011).
35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012).
3 Id. §§ 311–319.
4 Id. §§ 321–329.
5 § 18, 125 Stat. at 329.
6 Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and Judicial Review of
Patent Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 42, 90) [hereinafter Trial Rules]; Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review
Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business
Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42); Changes
to Implement Derivation Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,068 (Sept. 11, 2012) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 42).
7 Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756 (Aug. 14, 2012), to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 42) [hereinafter Trial Guide].
8 See infra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
1
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II. APPLICABLE CANDOR AND DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
A. NEW ETHICAL DUTIES

1. 37 C.F.R. § 42.11 (“Duty of Candor”). New USPTO Rule 42.11 expressly
imposes an obligation of candor and good faith on participants in post-grant
proceedings. It provides: “Parties and individuals involved in the proceeding
have a duty of candor and good faith to the [USPTO] during the course of a
proceeding.”9 The reason for the rule, according to the USPTO, is that
“honesty before the [USPTO] is essential to the integrity of the proceedings.”10
The USPTO has given some guidance regarding the nature of the obligation
imposed by this new rule: “The scope of the duty is comparable to the
obligations toward the tribunal imposed by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”11 That rule requires attorneys and unrepresented parties to
certif[y] that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances:
(1) [litigation papers are] not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing
law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or,
if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on
the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are
reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.12
Accordingly, new Rule 42.11 requires candor regarding the applicable law and
assertions of fact in post-grant proceedings.

9
10
11
12

37 C.F.R. § 42.11.
Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,618.
Id. at 48,630.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
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The USPTO has indicated that the duty imposed by Rule 42.11 will be
enforced via the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB or Board) sanctions
regime, outlined in 37 C.F.R. § 42.12(a).13 Rule 42.12(a) identifies several
categories of sanctionable “misconduct,” including:
(1) Failure to comply with an applicable rule or order in the
proceeding;
(2) Advancing a misleading or frivolous argument or request
for relief;
(3) Misrepresentation of a fact;
(4) Engaging in dilatory tactics;
(5) Abuse of discovery;
(6) Abuse of process;
(7) Any other improper use of the proceeding, including
actions that harass or cause unnecessary delay or an unnecessary
increase in the cost of the proceeding.14
Rule 42.12(b) specifies available sanctions which may “include entry of one or
more of the following”15:
(1) An order holding facts to have been established in the
proceeding;
(2) An order expunging or precluding a party from filing a
paper;
(3) An order precluding a party from presenting or contesting a
particular issue;
(4) An order precluding a party from requesting, obtaining, or
opposing discovery;
(5) An order excluding evidence;
(6) An order providing for compensatory expenses, including
attorney fees;
(7) An order requiring terminal disclaimer of patent term; or
(8) Judgment in the trial or dismissal of the petition.16

13
14
15
16

37 C.F.R. § 42.12(a) (2013).
Id.
Id. § 42.12(b).
Id.
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A comment submitted while the Trial Rules were being promulgated
questioned how the duty of candor, imposed on both petitioners and patent
owners by Rule 42.11, could be enforced against petitioners, “particularly when
the violation is discovered after the proceeding is terminated.”17 It is the case
that most of the potential sanctions delineated by Rule 42.12(b) would be
effective only during a proceeding, as they relate to the exclusion or preclusion
of evidence, discovery, or advocacy,18 or would result in judgment or dismissal
of the proceeding.19 Of the two other specified potential sanctions—“[a]n
order providing for compensatory expenses, including attorney fees”20 and “[a]n
order requiring terminal disclaimer of patent term”21—the former would be
available against petitioners as well as patent owners. However, since the PTAB
would presumably lose jurisdiction over a given post-grant proceeding (and the
parties thereto) after the expiration of the statutory period of its pendency,22 it
is unclear how it could impose any sanction on a party after that point. Indeed,
in response to the comment that raised this issue, the USPTO stated:
During the proceeding, an appropriate sanction under §42.12 may be
sought and at any time, including after the final written decision, the
matter may be submitted to the Office of Enrollment and
Discipline, or an appropriate sanction under §42.12 may be
sought as the [PTAB] has both statutory and inherent authority
to enforce its protective order.23
Thus the USPTO appears to take the position that “the proceeding” continues
beyond the point at which the PTAB issues a final written decision—at least for
purposes of the PTAB’s authority to impose sanctions. Specifically, the
Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,630.
See 37 C.F.R. § 42.12(b)(1)–(5).
19 See id. § 42.12(b)(8).
20 Id. § 42.12(b)(6).
21 Id. § 42.12(b)(7).
22 The applicable statute directs the USPTO to “prescribe regulations . . . requiring that the
final determination in an inter partes review be issued not later than 1 year after the date on which”
the proceeding is instituted by the PTAB. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2012). The PTAB has the
authority to extent the pendency “for good cause shown,” but for “not more than 6 months.” Id.
The same time limits govern post-grant review proceedings. See id. § 326(a)(11).
23 Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,630 (emphasis added).
Regarding the PTAB’s “statutory and inherent authority to enforce its protective order,” the
USPTO cited 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(6), 326(a)(6). These sections authorize the USPTO to
“prescrib[e] sanctions for abuse of discovery, abuse of process, or any other improper use of the
proceeding, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or an unnecessary increase in the cost
of the proceeding.” Id.
17
18

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2014

5

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2

6

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 22:1

USPTO’s view, apparently, is that the PTAB has the authority to impose
sanctions even after the PTAB has issued a final written decision, but the
PTAB’s power in this regard terminates at the conclusion of “the
proceeding”—presumably, at the expiration of the 12- or 18-month statutory
outer limit.24
However, the sanctions delineated in Rule 42.12 are not the only potential
consequence for a violation of Rule 42.11. According to the USPTO, “[i]f
appropriate, the misconduct may be reported to the Office of Enrollment and
Discipline for consideration of a sanction directed to the attorney or firm.”25
Obviously, registered practitioners are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of
the USPTO.26 But the USPTO has also authorized the Board to permit
unregistered practitioners to serve as counsel, pro hac vice, in the new post-grant
contested proceedings, subject to conditions the Board may impose.27 And the
USPTO has made clear that “[i]ndividuals appearing pro hac vice under § 42.10(c)
are subject to the USPTO Code of Professional Responsibility set forth in
§§ 10.20 et seq. and disciplinary jurisdiction under § 11.19(a).”28 Accordingly,
both registered practitioners and counsel recognized pro hac vice in post-grant
proceedings are subject to sanctions and disciplinary consequences for candor

See supra note 22.
Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,630. See also id. at 48,618 (“The Board also may refer a matter
to the Office of Enrollment and Discipline for investigation and, if warranted, further
proceedings under [37 C.F.R.] §§ 11.19 et seq.”).
26 See 35 U.S.C. § 32 (2012) (“The Director may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case, from further practice before the
[USPTO], any person, agent or attorney . . . who does not comply with the regulations . . .”
governing the recognition of persons authorized to represent parties before the Office).
27 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.10(c) (2013).
28 Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,618 (Aug. 14, 2012). See also Motorola Mobility LLC v. Michael
Arnouse, IPR2013-00010, 2012 WL 5792316, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 15, 2012) (authorizing the
filing of motions for admission pro hac vice; requiring the submission of an affidavit or declaration
from the person seeking to appear reciting, inter alia, that “[t]he individual seeking to appear has
read and will comply with the Office Patent Trial Practice Guide and the Board’s Rules of
Practice for Trials set forth in part 42 of the C.F.R.” and that “[t]he individual will be subject to
the USPTO Code of Professional Responsibility set forth in 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.20 et seq. and
disciplinary jurisdiction under 37 C.F.R. § 11.19(a)”).
24
25
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and other rule violations.29 However, “[b]ased on past experience, the [PTAB]
expects such instances to be rare.”30
2. 37 C.F.R. § 42.51 (“Discovery”). The second important new candor
obligation imposed by the rules governing the new USPTO contested
proceedings is a discovery-related obligation. New Rule 42.51 requires each
petitioner and patent owner, as part of “routine discovery,” to serve on its
opponent(s) “relevant information that is inconsistent with a position advanced by the party
during the proceeding.”31 Such “relevant information that is inconsistent with a
position advanced” is to be served “concurrent with the filing of the documents
or things that contains the inconsistency . . . [u]nless previously served.”32
The USPTO offers the following explanation for the “inconsistent
information” disclosure requirement:
Board experience has shown that the information covered by
§42.51(b)(1)(iii) is typically sought through additional discovery
and that such information leads to the production of relevant
evidence. However, the practice of authorizing additional
discovery for such information risks significant delay to the
proceeding and increased burdens on both the parties and the
Office. To avoid these issues, and to reduce costs and insure the
integrity and timeliness of the proceeding, the rule makes the
production of such information routine.33
The policy underlying this rule, therefore, is the avoidance of requests for
additional discovery,34 and ultimately, the pursuit of the USPTO’s objective of

29 See, e.g., Office Trial Patent Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,758 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“[T]he
revocation of pro hac vice is a discretionary action taking into account various factors, including
incompetence, unwillingness to abide by the Office’s Rules of Professional Conduct, and
incivility.”); see also Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,618 (“The Board also may refer a matter to the
Office of Enrollment and Discipline for investigation and, if warranted, further proceedings
under §§ 11.19 et seq.”).
30 Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,630.
31 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) (2013) (emphasis added). New Rule 42.51 defines three categories
of “routine discovery” for USPTO post-grant proceedings. Id. § 42.51(b)(1). “Except as the Board
may otherwise order,” the parties are entitled to (1) “any exhibit cited in a paper or in testimony”; (2)
“[c]ross examination of affidavit testimony”; and (3) “relevant information that is inconsistent with a
position advanced by the party during the proceeding.” Id. § 42.51(b)(1)(i)–(iii).
32 37 CF.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) (2014).
33 Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,622.
34 See id. at 48,640.
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“secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.”35
The USPTO gave an example:
[A]bsent [the obligation to disclose information inconsistent with
a position taken by a party], a petitioner could allege that the
claims are unpatentable based upon an intervening prior art [sic:
reference] where 35 U.S.C. 120 benefit is allegedly lacking due to
an enablement problem based on selected petitioner test data
showing a lack of enablement. While a patent owner could
obtain evidence of a petitioner’s contrary test data through
additional discovery once the trial is instituted, the [USPTO]
believes that the better course of action is to have the petitioner
provide any inconsistent test data earlier in the process, such that
the patent owner could potentially address the inconsistency in its
preliminary patent owner response.36
The USPTO has provided some additional guidance regarding the nature
and scope of this new disclosure obligation. First, the USPTO has
acknowledged that the obligation to disclose relevant inconsistent information
may require the disclosure of information other than that governed by 37
C.F.R. § 1.56.37 In fact, in promulgating the final rule, it noted that various
disclosure standards were advocated by persons submitting comments on the
proposed rules.38 The USPTO indicated that it considered the alternative
35 37 C.F.R. § 42.1 (providing that 37 C.F.R. pt. 42, which governs PTAB proceedings, “shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding”).
The PTAB has invoked 37 C.F.R. § 42.1, and alluded to the potential for sanctions for abuse of
discovery, in a decision resolving a discovery dispute. See EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC,
IPR2013-00082, IPR2013-00083, IPR2013-00084, IPR2013-00085, IPR2013-00086, IPR2013-00087
(P.T.A.B. June 19, 2013).
36 Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,640.
37 See id.
38 See id. at 48,639. The USPTO reports:
Several comments suggested that the petitioner should be required to make
disclosures of all evidence of which it is aware that may bear on the resolution
of the issues raised in the petition. In contrast, other comments suggested that
the Office should not require any duty to disclose information beyond [37
C.F.R.] § 1.56, while others suggested that the Office should limit the
information to only that which is material under Therasense[, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc)]. Additionally, other
comments suggested that the information sought could be obtained by
employing a more liberal standard for routine additional discovery.
Id.
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standards but “elects to employ the ‘inconsistent statement’ standard for the
routine discovery of information as such terminology is already employed in the
[USPTO’s] rules of evidence.”39
Second, only disclosure (of the inconsistent information)—not explanation
or characterization—is required. During the rulemaking, in response to
“comments express[ing] a concern that a party under [this obligation] would
have an affirmative duty to characterize the information disclosed,” the USPTO
abandoned its proposed requirement that a party making an “inconsistent
information” disclosure specify its relevance.40
Third, the rule is explicit regarding the preservation of legally recognized
evidentiary privileges and discovery immunities.41
Additionally, although the USPTO declined to explicitly define the term
“inconsistent,” it pointed to the Federal Rules of Evidence—specifically, the
use of the term “inconsistent statement” in those rules—as a source of
guidance.42
The USPTO provided two more examples of “situations exemplify[ing]
instances where disclosure of inconsistent statements are to be made”43:
Example 1: where a petitioner relies upon an expert affidavit
alleging that a method described in a patent cannot be carried
out, the petitioner would be required to provide any nonprivileged work undertaken by, or on behalf of, the petitioner that
is inconsistent with the contentions in the expert’s affidavit.
Example 2: where a patent owner relies upon surprising and
unexpected results to rebut an allegation of obviousness, the
patent owner should provide the petitioner with non-privileged
evidence that is inconsistent with the contention of unexpected
properties.44

Id. at 48,640.
Id. at 48,639.
41 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) (2013) (“This requirement does not make discoverable anything
otherwise protected by legally recognized privileges such as attorney-client or attorney work
product.”).
42 Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,639 (“The term ‘inconsistent statement’ is one that is wellrecognized in the field, as it appears in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which will have general
applicability to the proceedings (see [37 C.FR.] § 42.62). For example, FRE 613 and 806 permit
courts to admit evidence of a ‘declarant’s inconsistent statement or conduct.’ ”).
43 Trial Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,761.
44 Id.; see also Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,639 (providing the same examples).
39
40
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These examples illustrate how the “inconsistent statement” disclosure
obligation applies to both the petitioner and the patent owner. More
specifically, the rule specifies that the obligation at issue applies to “inventors,
corporate officers, and persons involved in the preparation or filing of the
documents or things.”45 Obviously, “persons involved in the preparation or
filing of the documents or things” would include counsel who draft and submit
papers advocating the parties’ positions, as well, presumably, as persons who
submit witness affidavits or declarations. Accordingly, the obligation to
disclose inconsistent information binds counsel, declarants, and parties.
The USPTO plainly contemplates the potential for Board-imposed sanctions
on parties who violate the duty imposed by Rule 42.51.46 In particular, the
USPTO has indicated that a violation of the Rule 42.51(b)(1)(iii) disclosure
obligation would constitute an abuse of discovery, subject to sanction under 37
C.F.R. § 42.12(b).47 But clearly counsel who knowingly participate in a failure
to comply with this rule could be referred for OED investigation and
discipline.48 According to the USPTO, “[i]f appropriate, the misconduct may
be reported to the Office of Enrollment and Discipline for consideration of a
sanction directed to the attorney or firm.”49 Furthermore, as discussed below, a
violation or alleged violation of the obligation to disclose inconsistent
information could lead to an inequitable conduct charge.50
B. THE CONTINUING DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

Patent practitioners are well-familiar with the duty of candor set forth in 37
C.F.R. § 1.56. Pursuant to that provision:
37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii).
See Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,630 (emphasis added).
47 Id. at 48,640. In response to a comment seeking “clarification as to how [the obligation to
disclose inconsistent information] would be policed during the proceeding,” the USPTO stated:
Section 42.51(b)(1)(iii) is a discovery provision. 35 U.S.C. 316(a)(6), as
amended, and 35 U.S.C. 326(a)(6) require that the [USPTO] promulgate rules
that prescribe sanctions for abuse of discovery. Section 42.12(a)(5) provides
that the [PTAB] may impose sanctions against a party for abuse of discovery.
Id.
48 See id. at 48,618 (“The Board . . . may refer a matter to the [OED] for investigation and, if
warranted, further proceedings under [37 C.F.R.] §§ 11.19 et seq.”).
49 Id. at 48,630.
50 See infra notes 87–99 and accompanying text; see also David Ben-Meir, Strategic Considerations of
the USPTO’s New Post-Grant Proceedings, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ADVISORY (Apr. 16, 2013),
available at http://www.alston.com/files/Publication/438e5ef3-ed03-4b1d-b832-4a45cb92e2f9/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d450beef-ae0d-469c-ae48-4b4cf42233b7/USPTOs-New-P
ost-Grant-Proceedings.pdf.
45
46
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Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing
with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all
information known to that individual to be material to
patentability as defined in this section.51
The duty of candor rests on the policy that “[t]he public interest is best
served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at the time an
application is being examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings
of all information material to patentability.”52
The duties of candor and disclosure are enforced primarily through the
judicially-created inequitable conduct doctrine, which provides an equitable
defense to a claim of patent infringement.53 It evolved from its foundation in
several Supreme Court cases in which the Court, applying the doctrine of
unclean hands, refused to enforce patents because of the serious prosecution
and litigation misconduct of the patentees.54 Over time, the courts applied the
doctrine to bar enforcement of patents procured through intentional
misconduct, such as withholding material information from55 or making
material misrepresentations to the patent office.56
The inequitable conduct doctrine has recently undergone significant change.
In April 2010, in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., the Federal Circuit
undertook to reconsider, en banc, the standards governing the defense.57 After
Therasense, a challenger must still “prove that the applicant misrepresented or
omitted material information with the specific intent to deceive the [USPTO]”58
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2013).
Id.
53 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
54 See id. at 1285–87 (citing and describing Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290
U.S. 240 (1933); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), overruled on
other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976), and Precision Instrument
Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945)).
55 See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming a
judgment of unenforceability based on the applicants’ intentional withholding of material test data).
56 See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding
clear error in the district court’s finding that the inventors had materially misrepresented the prior
art and intentionally sought to deceive the USPTO, and remanding for an equitable determination
on the ultimate issue of unenforceability).
57 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., Nos. 2008-1511, 2008-1512, 2008-1514, 20081595, 2010 WL 1655391 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2010) (ordering en banc review).
58 Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1287. The court had previously announced the “specific intent to
deceive” standard in Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
51
52
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by clear and convincing evidence.59
But a new, narrower definition of
materiality governs inequitable conduct determinations post-Therasense. The
general rule is that the misrepresented or omitted information must be “but-for
material”—the challenger must prove that “the [USPTO] would not have
allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed” or correct information.60
An exception to this requirement was made for “cases of affirmative egregious
misconduct.”61 Specifically, “[w]hen the patentee has engaged in affirmative
acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an unmistakably false
affidavit, the misconduct is material.”62
Regarding intent, “[a] finding that [a] misrepresentation or omission
amounts to gross negligence or negligence under a ‘should have known’
standard does not satisfy th[e] intent requirement.”63 The Therasense majority
gave an example:
“In a case involving the nondisclosure of information, clear and
convincing evidence must show that the applicant made a deliberate
decision to withhold a known material reference.” In other words,
the accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it
was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it.64
The third significant holding of Therasense concerned the “ ‘sliding scale,’
where a weak showing of intent [could] be found sufficient based on a strong
showing of materiality, and vice versa.”65 The majority declared: “[i]ntent and
materiality are separate requirements.”66 It instructed the district courts not to
use a “ ‘sliding scale,’ ” and specifically directed that “a district court may not
infer intent solely from materiality.”67 Again, giving an example, the court
Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1287.
Id. at 1291. In making such a determination, a court is to “apply the preponderance of the
evidence standard and give claims their broadest reasonable construction,” in accordance with
USPTO practice. Id. at 1291–92 (citing MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP)
§§ 706, 2111 (8th ed. rev. 8, July 2010)).
61 Id. at 1292.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1290. See, e.g., Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. HTC Corp., 732 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (affirming a determination of inequitable conduct based on the submission of an
intentionally false and inadequately corrected declaration alleging an actual reduction to practice).
64 Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (emphasis added by the Therasense majority)).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
59
60
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noted that “[p]roving that the applicant knew of a reference, should have
known of its materiality, and decided not to submit it to the [USPTO] does not
prove specific intent to deceive.”68
The court acknowledged that “a district court may infer intent from indirect
and circumstantial evidence.”69 But it reiterated that such an inference should
be drawn only if it is “the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn
from the evidence.”70 “Hence, when there are multiple reasonable inferences
that may be drawn, intent to deceive cannot be found.”71
Serious consequences can flow from a breach of the duty of candor. If a
court concludes that the duty was intentionally breached, the subject patent may
be held unenforceable for inequitable conduct.72
The USPTO has declared that the new post-grant contested “[p]roceedings,
not being applications for patents, are not subject to [37 C.F.R.] § 1.56.”73
Furthermore, “[i]nequitable conduct is not a basis for seeking the institution of
a trial before the Board.”74 Without a doubt, however, a candor violation in a
post-grant proceeding that is shown in subsequent district court litigation to

Id. (citing Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366).
Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1290–91.
72 Id. at 1287 (“To prevail on the defense of inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must
prove that the applicant misrepresented or omitted material information with the specific intent
to deceive the PTO.” (citing Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008))). See also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d
1226, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] breach of [the] duty [of candor], when coupled with an intent to
deceive or mislead the [USPTO], constitutes inequitable conduct, which, when proven, renders
the patent unenforceable.” (citing Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir.
1995))). The Therasense majority detailed the potential consequences:
[T]he remedy for inequitable conduct is the “atomic bomb” of patent law.
Unlike validity defenses, which are claim specific, inequitable conduct regarding
any single claim renders the entire patent unenforceable. . . . Moreover, the taint
of a finding of inequitable conduct can spread from a single patent to render
unenforceable other related patents and applications in the same technology
family. Thus, a finding of inequitable conduct may endanger a substantial
portion of a company’s patent portfolio.
A finding of inequitable conduct may also spawn antitrust and unfair
competition claims. Further, prevailing on a claim of inequitable conduct often
makes a case “exceptional,” leading potentially to an award of attorneys’ fees
under 35 U.S.C. § 285. A finding of inequitable conduct may also prove the
crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288–90 (citations omitted).
73 Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,638.
74 Id.
68
69
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satisfy the standards established by the Federal Circuit in Therasense could result
in a holding that the patent at issue is unenforceable.75
In particular, the withholding or misrepresentation of information by the
patentee during a post-grant contested proceeding, with the specific intent to
deceive the USPTO, could result in a subsequent judicial holding of
unenforceability if the court finds that but-for the omission or
misrepresentation, one or more claims of the patent would have been held
unpatentable by the PTAB.76 Alternatively, even absent but-for materiality,
intentionally deceptive misrepresentations could constitute “affirmative
egregious misconduct” warranting a holding of inequitable conduct.77 One
commentator opined that “[t]he relatively extensive and critical nature of a
patent holder’s interaction with the PTAB will increase the potential for
inequitable conduct.”78 Further, any attorney implicated in such misconduct
could be investigated and disciplined by the OED.79
Given what is at stake in the new PTAB proceedings for patent ownerrespondents and the public, the USPTO’s decision not to apply 37 C.F.R. § 1.56
in post-grant proceedings might seem surprising. After all, inter partes review
and post-grant review proceedings share an aspect of prosecution, in that patent
owners have the opportunity, albeit a limited one, to amend claims.80 In fact,
75 The issue of whether the duty of candor has been breached arises most frequently and
prominently in the context of enforceability challenges to issued patents, which challenges are
governed by Federal Circuit law, i.e., Therasense. See supra notes 57–72 and accompanying text. See
also Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293–94 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (declining to adopt the USPTO’s definition of
materiality, and noting that “this court is not bound by the definition of materiality in [USPTO]
rules” and that the USPTO lacks substantive rulemaking authority).
76 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
77 See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
78 Ben-Meir, supra note 50, at 3.
79 See Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053, 1057 (1987). According to the court:
In instances where a person entitled to practice before the PTO has breached
that duty of candor and good faith in prosecuting a patent application, it may
well be appropriate or necessary to issue sanctions directly against that attorney
or agent-at least in circumstances where there has been an intent to deceive,
defraud, or make misrepresentations to the PTO.
Id. See also 37 C.F.R. § 10.23(c)(10) (designating “[k]nowingly violating or causing to be violated
the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56” as practitioner “[m]isconduct”).
80 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(9), 326(a)(9); 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.121, 42.221. See also PATENT OFFICE
LITIGATION §§ 11.22–.25 (Robert Greene Sterne, Eldora L. Ellison, Ph.D., Jon E. Wright & Lori
A. Gordon eds., Thomson Reuters/West 2012) (discussing the patent owner’s opportunity to
amend); Paromita Chatterjee & Joseph E. Palys, IPR/PGR Proceedings: Litigation or Prosecution?,
Finnegan America Invents Act (May 13, 2013), available at http://www.aiablog.com/post-grant-pr
oceedings/iprpgr-proceedings-litigation-or-prosecution/ (referring to the “quasi-litigation and
prosecution aspects of IPR/PGR proceedings”).
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the USPTO “expect[s] that amendments to a patent will be sought” in the new
post-grant contested proceedings.81 Furthermore, a Rule 56 analog did apply in
inter partes reexamination proceedings,82 the predecessor post-grant inter partes
proceeding replaced by inter partes review and post-grant review.83
However, patent owners cannot broaden claims in the new proceedings,84 so
they should not succeed in reclaiming previously surrendered subject matter or
otherwise expanding their rights to include previously unclaimed subject matter.
And given that these proceedings are inter partes, and that the PTAB will police
amendments via motions to amend,85 it is extremely unlikely that claimbroadening attempts would succeed.
Furthermore, in the context of these new post-grant proceedings, it is clear
that the new duty of candor and routine discovery rules discussed above—37
C.F.R §§ 42.11 and 42.51—perform the same function in post-grant
proceedings that Rule 56 serves in ex parte prosecution. Section 42.51—the
duty to disclose to one’s adversar(ies) “relevant information that is inconsistent
with a position advanced by the party during the proceeding”86—is a broad
disclosure obligation, and one that will generally impose a greater burden on
patent owners than petitioners.87 For example, patent owners “may possess
81 See Trial Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,618 (identifying the potential for amendments as an example
of the “technical[ ] complex[ity]” of these proceedings and explaining that “[c]onsequently, the grant
of a motion to appear pro hac vice is a discretionary action taking into account the specifics of the
proceedings”).
82 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.933(a) (“Patent owner duty of disclosure in inter partes reexamination
proceedings”), which provides, in relevant part:
Each individual associated with the patent owner in an inter partes reexamination
proceeding has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the [USPTO],
which includes a duty to disclose to the [USPTO] all information known to that
individual to be material to patentability in a reexamination proceeding . . . .
83 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Stahl & Donald H. Heckenberg, The Scope and Ramifications of the New PostGrant and Inter Partes Review Proceedings at the USPTO, available at http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/DB
6EDC/assets/files/News/Fitz_PTO_1_4_8.pdf (“Although leaving ex parte reexamination
untouched, the AIA replaces inter partes reexamination with two new proceedings: post-grant review
and inter partes review.”); Five Things You Should Know About The Replacement of Inter Partes Reexamination
with Inter Partes Review on September 16, 2012, Hunton Williams Client Alert (July 2012), available at
http://www.hunton.com/files/News/154efdb7-f84c-4a59-aa63-88680b6228b7/Presentation/New
sAttachment/aaf2dbf6-9aa2-4553-bd3f-8900c93962be/IP_Alert_5_Things_You_Should_Know.
pdf.
84 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.121(a)(2)(ii), 42.221(a)(2)(ii) (“A motion to amend may be denied
where: . . . The amendment seeks to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce
new subject matter.”).
85 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.121, 42.221 (establishing procedures for motions to amend).
86 Id. § 42.51.
87 See Ken Burchfiel, The New Duty of Disclosure in Post-Grant Oppositions, USPTOPOSTGRANT.COM (Feb. 28, 2012), available at http://usptopost-grant.com/2012/02/28/the-new-duty-
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information such as prior art, arguments, declarations or amendments in related
applications, inventors’ publications, or statements or evidence submitted in
corresponding foreign applications that could be characterized as inconsistent
with an argument in support of patentability.”88 Such information could well be
“relevant” to and “inconsistent” with a patent owner’s arguments for
patentability or assertions of entitlement to newly claimed subject matter.89
And because noncompliance could, in circumstances satisfying Therasense,
constitute inequitable conduct, patent owners face a comparatively greater risk
if they too narrowly construe their Section 42.51 disclosure obligations.90
Additionally, as commentator Bryan Collins has noted, the disclosure
obligation imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) extends to persons who are
not bound by Rule 56:
This provision is broader than the typical duty of disclosure
obligation, as it expressly extends to corporate officers, and does
not limit itself to just those involved in the proceeding. Thus,
this provision creates an obligation to ensure that certain
personnel must disclose any facts or information inconsistent
with the position advanced by that party. Again, this is a
of-disclosure-in-post-grant-oppositions/ (“The burden of complying with the duty to disclose
inconsistent information will generally fall more heavily on the patent owner . . . .”).
88 Id. (“The petitioner’s risk is probably more limited, for example, to issues of estoppel and its
characterization of the real party in interest.”).
89 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.121(b), 42.221(b) (requiring that motions to amend “set forth . . . [t]he
support in the original disclosure of the patent for each claim that is added or amended;
and . . . [t]he support in an earlier-filed disclosure for each claim for which benefit of the filing
date of the earlier filed disclosure is sought”); see also Anthony A. Hartmann, Protecting Confidential
Information Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, BNA’S PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(Apr. 19, 2013), available at http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news
=a5395b90-a3db-42f2-b855-e9ed6958d1b2 (“For example, both petitioner and patent owner owe
a duty of candor and good faith, and must serve ‘relevant information that is inconsistent with a
position advanced by the party during the proceeding . . .’ The confidential information will likely
be in the form of lab notebooks, test records, sales and marketing data, competitive product data,
and pleadings from related proceedings. These types of documents are particularly relevant to
issues addressed in the trial proceedings, such as swearing behind prior art, establishing
inventorship, negating inferences of inherency with respect to the prior art, and weighing
evidence of secondary indicia of nonobviousness.”).
90 See Burchfiel, supra note 87 (“Few patent owners will conclude that prior statements or other
information are ‘inconsistent’ with arguments made in a post-grant proceeding, while many
opponents may well discover dramatically inconsistent information in the possession, or
presumed possession, of the patent owner.”). Patent owners and petitioners who fail to comply
with 37 C.F.R. § 42.51, of course, face equal risk of sanctions under 37 C.F.R. § 42.12. See supra
notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
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departure from the prior inter partes reexamination, where the
closest obligation was the general duty of disclosure under 37
CFR 1.56, limited to the inventors, attorney/agent, and other
persons involved in the preparation or prosecution of an
application.
Hence, Rule 42.51 will require disclosure of
information from a broader range of people.91
While the scope of the Section 42.51 disclosure obligation is “slightly narrower,
as it is limited to ‘information that is inconsistent with a position advanced by a
party,’ rather than information that is merely material to patentability,” Mr.
Collins concludes that the scope differential “slightly” favors “the petitioner, as
the patent owner still has the general duty of disclosure for ‘material’
information in addition to this duty to serve ‘inconsistent’ information, while
the petitioner is only limited to the ‘inconsistent’ information.”92
Indeed, concerns that violations of the “inconsistent information” disclosure
obligation imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.51 could lead to inequitable conduct-type
charges were expressed by a number of those who submitted comments during
the rule promulgation process.93 The USPTO ultimately did eliminate or
modulate certain aspects of the proposed rule.94 But as discussed above, the
final rule retained the duty to disclose “relevant information that is inconsistent
91 Bryan P. Collins, USPTO Trials: Understanding the Scope of Rules of Discovery, Pillsbury Client
Alert (Aug. 21, 2012) at 3, http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/Alert20120821In
tellectualPropertyUSPTOTrialsUnderstandingtheScopeandRulesofDiscovery.pdf.
92 See id.
93 See, e.g., Andrew S. Baluch, Public Comments Criticize USPTO’s Proposed Rules For “Routine
Discovery,” “Patentee Estoppel,” and Amendments in Board Trial Proceedings, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
PHARMA PATENTS (May 3, 2012), available at http://www.foley.com/public-comments-criticize-uspt
os-proposed-rules-for-routine-discovery-patentee-estoppel-and-amendments-in-board-trial-proceed
ings-05-03-2012/ (collecting comments expressing concerns regarding, for example, “the adoption
of disclosure obligations that may give rise to disputes in subsequent litigation over subjective
determinations, such as whether undisclosed information was . . . ‘inconsistent’ with a position
advanced by a party” and the breadth of the new obligation vis-à-vis Rule 56). See also Wab Kadaba
& Chris Durkee, Ramifications of the Final Inter Partes Review Practice and Trial Rules Under the AIA,
QUICK COUNSEL (Aug. 28, 2012), available at http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/rot
fprpatruta.cfm (noting that the Association of Corporate Counsel and others expressed concerns
that the proposed disclosure obligation “may frequently result in charges of misconduct or
inequitable conduct”); Andrew Baluch, Three Proposed USPTO Board Rules That Should Not Be Adopted,
PHARMAPATENTS (Mar. 11, 2012), available at http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2012/03/11/th
ree-proposed-uspto-board-rules-that-should-not-be-adopted/ (“Imposing such a requirement, and
burdening it with the specter of misconduct, is going to re-open the floodgates that the Federal
Circuit tried to dam up in Therasense.”).
94 See Kadaba & Durkee, supra note 93 (comparing the proposed and final versions of 37
C.F.R. § 42.51).
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with a position advanced by the party during the proceeding.”95 Although the
disclosure is to be made to the opposing party, as opposed to the USPTO (as is
the case with Rule 56), in an appropriate case it appears that a Therasensesatisfying showing could be made for an intentionally deceptive violation of 37
C.F.R. § 42.51.
Furthermore, the “inconsistent information” disclosure duty of 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.51 reinforces the new duty of candor imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.11. As
discussed above, it requires candor of the parties in assertions of law and fact.96
While the inter partes nature of these proceedings would likely ferret out any
mispresentations or omissions regarding the applicable law, it would not
necessarily expose candor violations regarding facts that are within the exclusive
possession of a party, particularly given the limited discovery available in these
proceedings.97 However, as to facts or other “information that is inconsistent
with a position advanced by the party during the proceeding,” 37 C.F.R. § 42.51
specifically requires disclosure.98 Accordingly, an intentional violation of 37
C.F.R. § 42.51 would also, at least in some cases, violate 37 C.F.R. § 42.11.
Depending on the circumstances, such violations could trigger either “butfor” or “affirmative egregious misconduct” materiality under Therasense.99 For
example, a challenger who demonstrates that withheld “inconsistent
information” would have altered a PTAB decision in the patentee’s favor on
even a single claim would establish “but-for” materiality. Alternatively, a
patentee’s affirmative misrepresentation (via argument or evidence) that is
undermined or belied by withheld information could be found to have engaged
in “affirmative egregious misconduct.”
Accordingly, to a significant extent, the new candor and disclosure duties are
the effective analog to Rule 56 in PTAB contested proceedings.
III. CANDOR OBLIGATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-GRANT
PROCEEDINGS
As discussed above, the USPTO has implemented new rules specifically
imposing candor and disclosure obligations on participants in the new postSee supra note 31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
97 See, e.g., Scott A. McKeown, Limited PTAB Discovery Frustrates District Court Litigators,
PATENTS POST-GRANT (May 1, 2013), available at http://www.patentspostgrant.com/additionaldiscovery-at-the-ptab-unlikely (discussing rules-based and Board-imposed limits on discovery in
post-grant contested proceedings).
98 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
95
96
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grant proceedings and has identified the parties and persons on whom those
obligations rest.100 These new rules have been overlaid onto the existing
landscape of USPTO duty of candor law and Federal Circuit inequitable
conduct law.101
Thus, the post-grant practitioner must not only integrate into his or her
practice an understanding of the new candor and disclosure obligations
(including their scope and applicability, the parties and persons bound, and the
potential consequences of their breach), but must do so in the context of new,
unfamiliar procedures implemented for the conduct of these proceedings.
These procedures include requirements that the parties make certain
representations and disclosures at various stages. In addition, the procedural
rules authorize the filing of various motions, which will necessarily require the
parties to make factual representations in order to justify the relief requested.
And of course, parties will be submitting affidavits and declarations of counsel
and witnesses (fact and expert) and documentary and testimonial evidence on
which their litigation positions rest.
Such statements and representations clearly must be made carefully and in
light of the applicable candor obligations. Likewise, practitioners must take care
to fully comply with all discovery and disclosure obligations in order to avoid
material omissions that could result in Board sanctions, USPTO discipline, or
inequitable conduct determinations. Infringement defendants will no doubt
carefully scrutinize the conduct of patentees in post-grant proceedings.102 The
following are examples of statements and representations, motions, responses
and disclosures, and evidentiary submissions that could give rise to candor
violations—or alleged violations—in the context of post-grant USPTO trial
proceedings.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
102 Ben-Meir, supra note 50, at 3 (“For a patent holder defending its patent, . . . interactions [with
the PTAB] are especially fraught with risk. In the context of trying to save its patent, a patent holder
will be providing statements and evidence on the record to the PTAB. These statements and
evidence will be provided over a relatively short period and may be made in the context of other
simultaneous or subsequent proceedings relating to the same patent. The potential for positional
inconsistencies between these various proceedings is high and requires careful coordination to avoid
them. An astute challenger that fails to cancel a patent at the [USPTO] will be keenly aware of the
positions the patent holder has taken in [USPTO] litigation, looking for subsequent inconsistent
statements that can support new defenses against the patent holder.”).
100
101
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A. REPRESENTATIONS RE BARS AND ESTOPPELS

Each of the new post-grant proceedings is initiated by the filing of a
petition.103 In the case of inter partes review and post-grant review, the petition
must include a certification that the petitioner is not barred or estopped from
requesting the proceeding.104
These requirements stem from the statutory limitations on the filing of postgrant proceedings and the estoppels that will bind parties and their privies
following the entry of written merits decisions in such proceedings. In
particular, “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if, before the date on
which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner or real party in
interest filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.”105
The statute further provides that, as to “a claim . . . that results in a final written
decision” in an inter partes review proceeding, the inter partes review
petitioner—or “the real party in interest or privy” of the petitioner—“may not
request or maintain a proceeding before the [USPTO] with respect to that claim
on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during
that inter partes review.”106 Similarly, a written decision regarding a claim in an
inter partes review bars the later assertion—in a district court or Section 337
(ITC) proceeding—of an invalidity defense regarding that claim based “on any
ground that the petitioner raised or could have raised during that inter partes
review.”107 Corresponding limitations and estoppels apply in and are triggered
by post-grant review proceedings.108
A petitioner’s representation that it is not barred or estopped from
requesting a post-grant proceeding is a significant assertion made in furtherance
of a statutory objective. Petitioners should anticipate that their patent owner
opponents—and potentially the Board and OED—will accord such statements
appropriate scrutiny.

103 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (governing petitions in derivation proceedings); id. § 312 (governing
petitions for inter partes review); id. § 322 (governing petitions for post-grant review).
104 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a) (explaining the “grounds for standing” in inter partes review); id. §
42.204(a) (“Grounds for standing” in post-grant review).
105 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1).
106 Id. § 42.104(e)(1).
107 Id. § 42.104(e)(2).
108 See 35 U.S.C. § 325(a)(1), (e).
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B. IDENTIFICATION OF REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST AND PRIVIES

The petitioner (in the petition) and the patent owner “or applicant in the
case of derivation” (“within 21 days of service of the petition”) are each
required to “[i]dentify each real party-in-interest for the party.”109
The Office Patent Trial Practice Guide (Trial Guide) explains:
The core functions of the “real party-in-interest” and “privies”
requirement [sic: are] to assist members of the Board in
identifying potential conflicts, and to assure proper application of
the statutory estoppel provisions. The latter, in turn, seeks to
protect patent owners from harassment via successive petitions
by the same or related parties, to prevent parties from having a
“second bite at the apple,” and to protect the integrity of both the
USPTO and Federal Courts by assuring that all issues are
promptly raised and vetted.110
It further states:
Whether a party who is not a named participant in a given
proceeding nonetheless constitutes a “real party-in-interest” or
“privy” to that proceeding is a highly fact-dependent question.
Such questions will be handled by the Office on a case-by-case
basis taking into consideration how courts have viewed the terms
“real party-in-interest” and “privy.”111
But it notes that “at a general level, the “real party-in-interest” is the party that
desires review of the patent.”112
Regarding “privies,”
[t]he Office intends to evaluate what parties constitute “privies”
in a manner consistent with the flexible and equitable
considerations established under federal caselaw. Ultimately, that
analysis seeks to determine whether the relationship between the
37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)–(b)(1) (2013) (entitled “Mandatory Notices”).
Trial Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759. The USPTO has also noted that “[t]he identity of a real
party-in-interest might also affect the credibility of evidence presented in a proceeding.” Trial
Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,617.
111 Trial Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759 (internal citations omitted).
112 Id.
109
110
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purported ‘privy’ and the relevant other party is sufficiently close
such that both should be bound by the trial outcome and related
estoppels.113
The Trial Guide identifies as one consideration “relevant to the question of
whether a non-party may be recognized as a ‘real party-in-interest’ or
‘privy’ . . . whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over
a party’s participation in a proceeding.”114 The Trial Guide notes that “a party
that funds and directs and controls an IPR or PGR petition or proceeding
constitutes a ‘real party-in-interest,’ even if that party is not a ‘privy’ of the
petitioner.”115 It further identifies relevant factors to be considered in the
context of trade association and joint defense group membership.116
As noted above, representations regarding “real part[ies]-in-interest” and
“privies” are required to assist the Board in making important determinations
regarding potential conflicts and the application of estoppels.117 Petitioners and
patent owners should make such assertions after careful investigation and with
due regard to their candor obligations.
C. REPRESENTATIONS IN MOTIONS

The rules governing post-grant trial proceedings authorize or require various
motions in particular circumstances. Such motions include, for example,
motions to secure protective orders,118 requests for permissions to file under
seal,119 motions for orders authorizing expungement of confidential information
prior to publication,120 and motions for additional discovery.121 These motions
will necessarily be based on factual representations asserted to justify the
requested relief. As discussed above, such assertions of fact are governed by
the applicable duty of candor.122

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id.
Id. at 48,760.
Id.
See supra Part III.A.
37 C.F.R. § 42.54 (2013).
Id. §§ 42.14, 42.55.
Id. § 42.56.
Id. § 42.51(b)(2). See also infra notes 137–42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
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D. SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENTIARY SUBMISSIONS

The presentation of substantive proofs in the new contested proceedings
will primarily be by way of witness affidavits and declarations and transcripts of
deposition testimony.123 Such evidence will often include the presentation of
facts, test results, and data.124 According to the Trial Guide:
4. Testimony Must Disclose Underlying Facts or Data: The Board
expects that most petitions and motions will rely upon affidavits
of experts. Affidavits expressing an opinion of an expert must
disclose the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is
based. See Fed. R. Evid. 705; and [37 C.F.R.] § 42.65. Opinions
expressed without disclosing the underlying facts or data may be
given little or no weight. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127
F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (nothing in the Federal Rules of
Evidence or Federal Circuit jurisprudence requires the fact finder
to credit unsupported assertions of an expert witness).
5. Tests and Data: Parties often rely on scientific tests and data to
support their positions. Examples include infrared spectroscopy
graphs, high-performance liquid-chromatography data, etc. In
addition to providing the explanation required in [37 C.F.R.]
§ 42.65, a party relying on a test or data should provide any other
information the party believes would assist the Board in
understanding the significance of the test or the data.125
Such submissions obviously will invite scrutiny from post-grant proceeding
opponents and parties subsequently charged with infringement of the subject
patents and could potentially qualify under the Federal Circuit’s “but-for
material” or “affirmative egregious misconduct” materiality standards for
123 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(a) (“Uncompelled direct testimony must be submitted in the form of an
affidavit. All other testimony, including testimony compelled under 35 U.S.C. § 24 [authorizing the
issuance of district court subpoenas to compel testimony], must be in the form of a deposition
transcript.”). The same rule authorizes the Board to “authorize or require live or video-recorded
testimony.” Id.
124 See, e.g., id. (relating to “[t]aking testimony”); id. § 42.65 (relating to “[e]xpert testimony; tests
and data”).
Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.2, “Affidavit means affidavit or declaration under [37 C.F.R.]
§ 1.68.” Under the latter rule, “Any document to be filed in the Patent and Trademark Office
and which is required by any law, rule, or other regulation to be under oath may be subscribed to
by a written declaration.” Id. § 1.68.
125 Trial Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,763.
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inequitable conduct.126 Furthermore, like counsel for the parties, registered
practitioners who serve as expert declarants or other witnesses must heed their
candor and disclosure obligations, as they are subject to the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the USPTO whether serving as witnesses or counsel.
E. “RELEVANT INFORMATION THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH A POSITION
ADVANCED DURING THE PROCEEDING”

As discussed in detail above, the new rules impose on “inventors, corporate
officers, and persons involved in the preparation or filing of the documents or
things” an obligation to disclose “relevant information that is inconsistent with
a position advanced by the party during the proceeding concurrent with the
filing of the documents or things that contains the inconsistency.”127 This is an
affirmative disclosure obligation that requires the persons bound by the duty to
consider—with respect to every position advanced during a contested
proceeding and regarding every document or thing submitted in support of
every such position—whether the person is aware of “information that is
inconsistent with [that] position.”128 Further, the obligation will persist
throughout the proceeding, will necessitate periodic consideration and
evaluation, and will have to be met under the tight time deadlines the statute
imposes on post-grant proceedings.129
The “inconsistent information” disclosure obligation is not one to be taken
lightly given the potential for sanctions, disciplinary consequences, and—for the
patent owner, should the information at issue qualify as material under
Therasense130 and be shown to have been withheld with the specific intent to

See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291–92. Regarding materiality, the court held:
[A]s a general matter, the materiality required to establish inequitable conduct is
but-for materiality. . . . Although but-for materiality generally must be proved to
satisfy the materiality prong of inequitable conduct, this court recognizes an
exception in cases of affirmative egregious misconduct . . . . When the patentee
has engaged in affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an
unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is material.
127 See supra Part II.A.2.
128 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii).
129 See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (“The Director shall prescribe regulations — requiring that the final
determination in an inter partes review be issued not later than 1 year after the date on which the
Director notices the institution of a review under this chapter, except that the Director may, for
good cause shown, extend the 1-year period by not more than 6 months.”); see also id. § 326(a)(11)
(prescribing the same pendency limitations for post-grant review proceedings).
130 See supra notes 57–72 and accompanying text.
126
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deceive the USPTO131—the penalty of unenforceability for inequitable
conduct.132
F. OTHER DISCOVERY DISCLOSURES, RESPONSES, AND OMISSIONS

In addition to “routine discovery,”133 the final rules authorize “mandatory
initial disclosures.”134 “Mandatory initial disclosures” are specific categories of
information identified in the Trial Guide135 that are discoverable either pursuant
to an agreement of the parties or, if no such agreement, by motion, if granted.136
The rules further authorize requests for (and inter-party agreements to provide)
additional discovery.137 “The types of discovery available under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure can be sought by the parties.”138
According to the USPTO:

131 See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (“To prevail on a claim of inequitable conduct, the accused
infringer must prove that the patentee acted with the specific intent to deceive the PTO.”
(citations omitted)).
132 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
133 See supra note 31.
134 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(a).
135 See Trial Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,762.
136 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(a).
137 Id. § 42.51(b)(2) (requiring a party who moves for additional discovery to “show that such
additional discovery is in the interests of justice, except in post-grant reviews where additional
discovery is limited to evidence directly related to factual assertions advanced by either party in
the proceeding”); id. § 42.224(a) (providing that “[r]equests for additional discovery may be
granted upon a showing of good cause as to why the discovery is needed”). See also Trial Guide,
77 Fed. Reg. at 48,761.
The USPTO has addressed the difference between the “interests-of-justice” and “good
cause” standards, as follows:
While an interests-of-justice standard would be employed in granting additional
discovery in inter partes reviews and derivation proceedings, the post-grant and
covered business method patent reviews would employ a good cause standard in
granting additional discovery. . .
Good cause and interests-of-justice are closely related standards, but the
interests-of-justice standard is slightly higher than good cause. While a good
cause standard requires a party to show a specific factual reason to justify the
needed discovery, under the interests- of-justice standard, the Board would look
at all relevant factors. Specifically, to show good cause, a party would be
required to make a particular and specific demonstration of fact. Under the
interests-of-justice standard, the moving party would also be required to show
that it was fully diligent in seeking discovery and that there is no undue prejudice
to the non-moving party.
Id. at 48,660–61.
138 Trial Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,761.
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Routine discovery is designed to place the parties on a level
playing field and to streamline the process. Additional discovery
is that discovery that goes beyond the routine and, unless the
parties agree to the additional discovery, would require a joint
conference call with the Board to discuss a party’s request for the
additional discovery.139
In the context of discovery, the USPTO has observed that the parties will
often have equal access to relevant evidence.140 It provides the following
rationale for limiting discovery:
Proceedings before the Board differ from most civil litigation in
that the proponent of an argument before the Board generally has
access to relevant evidence that is comparable to its opponent’s
access. Consequently, the expense and complications associated
with much of discovery can be avoided. For instance, since
rejections are commonly based on the contents of the
specification or on publicly available references, there is no
reason to presume that the patent owner has better access to
evidence of unpatentability on these grounds than the
petitioner.141
However, it has also acknowledged that as to some issues, one party may have
access to information that the other lacks and therefore may allow additional
discovery in certain cases:
Exceptions occur particularly when the ground of unpatentability
arises out of conduct, particularly conduct of a purported
inventor. In such cases, discovery may be necessary to prove
such conduct, in which case the proponent of the evidence may
move for additional discovery.142

139
140
141
142

Id. at 48,636.
Id. at 48,621–22.
Id.
Id. at 48,622.
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The duty of candor and the potential consequences (including, for the patentee,
inequitable conduct) raise the stakes with regard to disclosure obligations of
both parties as to information in their exclusive possession.143
G. TRANSLATIONS

The Trial Guide explains:
All proceedings before the Board will be conducted in English.
Translations therefore must be provided for: (1) Those
documents produced in discovery under [37 C.F.R.] § 42.51; and
(2) all documents relied on, or otherwise used, during the
proceedings.144
The submission of an inaccurate or misleading translation could constitute a
candor violation or even inequitable conduct.145

143 See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 753–54 (2009) (explaining the role of the inequitable conduct doctrine
in fostering the disclosure of information otherwise not available to the USPTO). The Therasense
majority described the role of the duty of disclosure, particularly with regard to information in the
sole possession of the patent applicant, as follows:
Because the PTO lacks the investigative and research resources to look behind
representations by applicants and their counsel, it necessarily relies on those
representations as to many facts that arise during the prosecution of patent
applications, including experimental results obtained by the applicants, the state
of the prior art, and the knowledge of persons of skill in the art in the field in
question. Some of these facts will be uniquely in the hands of the applicant and,
as a practical matter, undiscoverable by an examiner at the PTO. For those
reasons, the PTO has imposed a duty on applicants to provide examiners with
information that is material to patentability.
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1309–10.
144 Trial Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,761.
145 See, e.g., Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). According to the court:
[W]e discern no clear error in the district court’s findings with respect to
materiality and intent, and hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in finding the ’636 patent to be unenforceable for SEL’s inequitable conduct in
providing a misleadingly incomplete, partial translation of the Canon reference
and a narrow and incomplete concise statement.
Id.; see also David Hricik, Where the Bodies Are: Current Exemplars of Inequitable Conduct and How to
Avoid Them, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 287, 303–06 (2004) (describing various ways in which
inequitable conduct issues can arise out of the submission of translations).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The new USPTO post-grant contested proceedings offer interesting new
opportunities for patent challengers as well as patent owners. Careful planning,
sophisticated strategic thinking, and skillful execution will be required to
maximize the opportunities and minimize the risks and dangers that lie in and
around this new arena. For parties and counsel alike, those risks include the
potential for violations of existing and new duties of candor and disclosure.
The policies and rationales relating to the duty of candor as traditionally
applied in ex parte cases do not translate perfectly into the new world of
USPTO inter partes trial proceedings. By definition, the parties in these
proceedings will have the opportunity to test, inquire behind, and scrutinize one
other’s assertions and evidence. These opportunities, without more, should
necessarily promote truth-telling and appropriate disclosure, as witness and
evidence credibility assumes enhanced significance in an inter partes setting.
But the new rules appropriately recognize that what is at stake transcends
the interests of the USPTO litigants. “[T]he public has a special interest in
seeing that patent monopolies ‘spring from backgrounds free from fraud or
other inequitable conduct.’ ”146 The old and new rules relating to the duties of
candor and disclosure seek to implement that recognition.

146

Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1308–09 (citations omitted).
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